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THE CORPORATE DEFAMATION PLAINTIFF IN THE ERA OF
SLAPPS: REVISITING NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN
Corporations have increasingly used defamation suits as an offensive weapon.
Many of these suits may be defined as SLAPP suits-Strategic Litigation Against
Public Participation. These suits, often meritless, are designed to harass and
silence a corporations'critics. Following a survey of the history ofdefamation law
and the protection offree speech, this Note argues that corporations should be
treated as per se publicfigures in defamation suits. This derives from the uniquely
public nature of a corporation and an assumption of the risk of defamatory
falsehoods that arises from the act of incorporation. Treating corporations in this
manner would place a heavier burden on corporations by requiring a showing of
actual malice in their defamation claims. This Note concludes that such a
requirement would provide a better balance between corporations' defamation
concerns and their opponents 'free speech rights.
[T]he dignity of a person is acknowledged to all human beings; and as
a consequence there is proclaimed, as a fundamental right, the right of
free movement in search for truth and in the attainment of moral good
and ofjustice, and also the right to a dignified life ... .
INTRODUCTION
Defamation involves a conflict. While the freedom to speak is an essential
principle of personal liberty, defamation law seeks to remedy the reputational
injuries resulting from speech. The lines demarcating the interest of speech and the
interest of reputation unavoidably intersect. For this reason, establishing the
constitutional limits on the tort of defamation has proved a challenging and dynamic
endeavor.
As part of this effort, the status of the defamation plaintiff has been a critical
inquiry since the United States Supreme Court's 1964 decision in New York Times
v. Sullivan.2 The Court established that public officials and public figures must
meet a higher standard of proof-actual malice-in order to prevail as defamation
plaintiffs. While the Court has carved out several tests for determining when a
plaintiff is a public figure, the Court has yet to speak definitively on the status of
corporations.
Since New York Times, corporations have been making greater use of the
POPE JOHN XXIII (Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli), PACEM IN TERRis 49 (1963).
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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defamation tort. Intimidation lawsuits have become a major weapon in the
corporate arsenal. Using defamation suits against civic-minded citizens, groups,
and publishers, corporations have drastically squelched citizen and news media
involvement. In this way, the defamation suit has become a tool to ward off public
criticism and oversight.
At the same time, corporate criticism and oversight has become more crucial.
The corporate entity has gained influence over the political process and achieved
greater economic power than before. Traditional state functions have been
delegated to the private sector. Corporations have continued to receive public
benefits such as tax breaks and subsidies. All of these factors weigh in favor of
making corporations more publicly accountable. A greater need for accountability
demands that citizens be afforded the same First Amendment protections when
speaking about corporations as afforded by New York Times when speaking about
public officials. Corporate plaintiffs should be treated as per se public figures; that
is, in order to prevail in defamation suits, corporations must prove that defamatory
statements were made with actual malice.
Part I of this Note describes current use of defamation law by corporations.
Part II outlines the development of First Amendment protection of speech directed
at public officials, public figures, and corporations. Part III argues that corporations
should be treated as per se public figures in defamation suits. Part IV concludes
that a per se public figure rule would alleviate several current problems in
defamation law.
I. USE OF DEFAMATION LAW BY CORPORATIONS
Corporations have begun to use defamation suits as an offensive tactic. Many
defamation suits may be defined as Strategic Litigation Against Public
Participation, or SLAPPs.3 SLAPPs are "meritless suits ' intended not to win but
"to intimidate and harass political critics into silence.. . ."' SLAPPs are aimed at
"punish[ing] people for exercising their right, guaranteed by the First Amendment
to the Constitution, to participate in public discourse."6 For example, a New York
I See George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7
PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 3, 4 (1989); see also Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S.
731, 740-41 (1983) ("A lawsuit no doubt may be used as a powerful instrument of coercion
or retaliation .... [and] the chilling effect upon willingness to engage in protected activity
is multiplied where the complaint seeks damages. ").
4 John C. Barker, Common-Law andStatutory Solutions to the Problem ofSLAPPs, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 395, 399 (1993).
' Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse ofLibel Law
for Political Purposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL. 417, 423 (1991).
6 RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST 163 (1996). Professor Pring states,
"Yes it is true. Today, you, your neighbors, your community leaders can be sued for
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resident was sued for defamation because she circulated fliers that called a local
developer "greedy."' These suits are aimed not at rectifying truly defamatory
statements made by defendants, but rather, at intimidating them from voicing their
public concerns.' Moreover, corporations use SLAPPs to discourage involvement
not only by the named defendants, but also by their neighbors and the remaining
community.9
SLAPP suits share several common characteristics. Plaintiffs are usually large
corporations, typically private developers or businesses seeking to enter the
community.' Some investigators estimate that thousands of such suits are filed
each year." Plaintiffs utilize a multitude of causes of action, but defamation is the
most common. 2 Plaintiffs' goals are to delay and distract political adversaries, and
thereby tie up their resources by forcing them to pay significant expenses. 3
Additionally, plaintiffs seek to de-politicize issues, and thereby force defendants out
of the legislative process, where public opinion can win the day, and into the win-
lose process of court." Going to court also switches public attention from the
corporation to the defendant." Simply put, SLAPPs are "another tool in a strategy
to win a political and/or economic battle."' 6
The effectiveness of SLAPPs for corporations derives from the disparity of
resources between the plaintiff and defendant. Corporate plaintiffs may have huge
treasuries with which to mount protracted litigation. As one defense lawyer stated,
"[flew average citizens have the wherewithall [sic] to defend themselves against the
armoire of monies expended by... corporations-who not only may have the
millions of dollars, just for telling government what you think, want, or believe in." Id.
(citing George Pring, interview with the authors (Oct. 28, 1994)).
7 See Sharlene A. McEvoy, "The Big Chill": Business Use of the Tort of Defamation
to Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 503,504
(1990) (citing Boccella, Expensive Free Speech, NEWSDAY, Mar. 18, 1988, at 3). In fact,
SLAPPs have been brought for:
[w]riting a letter to the president of the United States opposing a political
appointment; testifying against a real estate developer at a zoning hearing; filing
administrative agency appeals; complaining to a school board about unfit
teachers; peacefully demonstrating against government action; collecting
signatures on a petition; and, campaigning for or against a state ballot.
NADER & SMITH, supra note 6, at 164-65.
S See McEvoy, supra note 7, at 504.
9 See Costantini & Nash, supra note 5, at 466-70.
'o See Barker, supra note 4, at 400.
" See Pring, supra note 3, at 4.
' See Barker, supra note 4, at 402.
'3 See id at 403.
'4 See id. at 405.
i See id. at 406.
16 Penelope Canan, The SLAPPfrom a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
23, 30 (1989).
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means to mount suits, but can claim further tax advantages for the legal expenses
involved."' 7  Defendants, on the other hand, are usually "middle-of-the-road
Americans," often involved in public affairs for the first time. 8 For defendants
the price of civil involvement can be very high, not only in terms of
attorney's fees and general litigation expenses, but also through the
disruption of families, physical illness and emotional upheaval. Such
protracted vexation can have the effect of discouraging even the hardiest
of souls from exercising their first amendment rights. 9
SLAPPs present difficult questions because each party in the dispute invokes
important interests. Nevertheless, defendants suffer particular harm because they
may be forced to defend against truly meritless claims. One scholar describes these
suits as pitting
two sets of fundamental constitutional rights against each other: (1)
defendants' rights of free speech and petition and (2) plaintiffs' rights
of access to the judicial system and rights to non-falsely maligned
reputations.... Defendants must be protected from entirely frivolous
intimidation suits designed to chill legitimate participation in public
affairs.2°
Those defendants who do proceed to court win eighty to ninety percent of all suits
argued on the merits. 2' Nevertheless, many defendants capitulate to the plaintiff's
demands, either through settlement or by withdrawing political opposition.22
The existing standards do not sufficiently protect defendants.23 It is because so
'v McEvoy, supra note 7, at 506 (quoting Notice of Motion to Amend Answer, Terra
Homes, Inc. v. Blake, Index No. 1563/88, at 3).
11 NADER& SMITH, supra note 6, at 165. Media defendants are also a common target of
SLAPPs. As one journalist noted:
[B]usiness reporting is on the rise. Frequently, that reporting has rejected the
older, more deferential style and brought a new aggressiveness to the business
desk. . . .Moreover, media businesses involved in public relations and
advertising are at risk for defamation actions as well, particularly when waging
aggressive campaigns that compare one company to another.
Matthew D. Bunker, The Corporate Plaintiff as Public Figure, 72 JOURNALISM & MASS.
COMM. Q. 597 (1995).
'9 McEvoy, supra note 7, at 505.
20 Barker, supra note 4, at 397-98.
21 See Pring, supra note 3, at 23.
22 See id.
23 See Barker, supra note 4, at 406-07. Since "winning is not a SLAPP plaintiffs prime
motivation, existing safeguards are inadequate. They focus on preventing plaintiffs from
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many meritless suits proceed past the pleading stage that SLAPPs remain an
effective deterrent to speech.24 Indeed, "[tlhe most effective way to combat the
SLAPP industry is for laws to be enacted that prevent SLAPPs from getting off the
ground."2 Requiring a standard of actual malice means that fewer SLAPPs will be
filed, many will be dismissed before they become a viable threat, and many can be
dismissed earlier in the litigation before they have taken their toll on defendants.
II. DEFAMATION AND FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES
A. Defamation
Defamation consists of the "twin torts" of libel and slander.26 At common law,
the defamation action guarded against damage to a person's reputation in regards
to their business, trade, profession, or office.27 Prosser defines defamation as that
which
tends to hold the plaintiff up to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause
him to be shunned or avoided .... [and is] that which tends to injure
"reputation" in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect,
goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him. It
winning meritless suits. SLAPP plaintiffs, however, expect to lose their suits, and often
concede the litigation costs, such as the defendants' attorney's fees, as costs of doing
business." Id.
24 See NADER & SMITH, supra note 6, at 165 (Of those SLAPP suits that are not
dismissed outright, the "overwhelming majority settle, on terms quite favorable to the
SLAPPer. Typically, the defendants agree to stop their public activism. Some defendants
offer an apology for their activism.").
25 Id at 180.
26 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOKOFTHE LAWOFTORTS § II I, at 737 (4th ed. 1971).
The distinction between the two torts is mostly a relic of the past. See Patricia Nassif Fetzer,
The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff as First Amendment "Public Figure: " Nailing the
Jellyfish, 68 IOWA L. REV. 35,35-36 n.2 (1982). Libel and slander are both actions for injury
to reputation due to false publications. See PROSSER, supra, § 111, at 737; 3 RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OFTORTS § 558 (1976) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Historically, slander involved
oral communications, whereas libel involved written words. See PROSSER § 112, at 751.
Today, libel encompasses all communications embodied in a permanent tangible form. See
id. at 752. Therefore, defamation law treats as libel television and radio broadcasts, even if
not read from a script. See RESTATMENT § 568A.
2 See PROSSER, supra note 26, § 112, at 754; see also Harmon v. Delany, 2 Strange 898
(1731) ("The law has always been very tender of the reputation of tradesman, and therefore
words spoken of them in the way of their trade will bear an action that will not be actionable
in the case of another person.").
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necessarily. involves the idea of disgrace... .2
Beginning with this broad definition, defamation law developed a long list of
privileges, beginning with the privilege of truth, and perhaps culminating with the
New York Times v. Sullivan constitutional privilege.
B. The Development of the New York Times v. Sullivan Privilege
At common law, courts considered defamatory statements constitutionally
unprotected speech.29 All defamation actions were within the exclusive province
of the states.3 Nevertheless, the common law recognized several areas of speech
that were privileged. For example, statements of truth, judicial proceedings, and
executive communications could not be subjects of a defamation suit." Most
importantly, courts recognized "the qualified privilege of 'fair comment' on matters
of public interest ... ."I2 Matters of public interest involved communications to
those expected to take official action for the protection of some interest on behalf
of the public.3 However, this privilege
was not limited to officers and candidates, but extended to other matters
of public concern, such as work to be paid for out of public funds, the
admission or disbarment of attorneys, and the management of
institutions, such as schools, charities, and churches, in which the public
has a legitimate interest. Likewise any private enterprise, to the extent
that it begins to affect the general interests of the community ... was
held to be a proper subject for such privileged comment.'
28 PROSSER, supra note 26, § 11I, at 739.
29 The Court considered defamatory statements to be lacking in any constitutional value.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that libelous
statements are one of a "well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem").
30 See Fetzer, supra note 26, at 38.
31 See id.
32 Fetzer, supra note 26, at 38; see also 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 140-
41 (1969 & Supp. 1976); PROSSER, supra note 26, at 822. The fair comment privilege
extended to discussions of public officials and public events. See, e.g., Broking v. Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc., 76 Ariz. 334, 340 (1953); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Publ'ns, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671,674 (1974). However, some courts limited this
privilege only to opinion statements. See Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 885 (La.
1977).
33 See PROSSER, supra note 26, § 1 15, at 83 1. "Thus, for example, complaints made by
members of the public to school boards about the character, competence or conduct of their
teachers are subject to a qualified privilege." Id at 792.
34 PROSSER, supra note 26, § 115, at 831-32; see also Bishop v. Wometco Enters., 235
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Building on this common law privilege, the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan
sought to balance the interests of free speech with the interest of protection of
reputation. 5
The case arose from an advertisement published in The.New York Times: in
support of the southern civil rights movement. The advertisement inaccurately
described, inter alia, reports of police misconduct toward demonstrators. An
Alabama official responsible for supervising the Montgomery Police Department
filed a suit alleging defamation. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court award of $500,000.36 In a revolutionary opinion, the United States Supreme
Court held that defamatory publications may be entitled to constitutional
protection." The Court held that "libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations."3 Protection of speech, the Court stated, was based on
a "profound national commitment" to achieving public debate that is "uninhibited,
robust, and wide open."'39 The Court reasoned that "erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to survive."' .Critically
underlining the opinion was the notion that in order to protect all speech, some false
speech must be protected.4' Accordingly, the Court held that plaintiffs who are
public officials must meet a higher standard:
The constitutional guarantees require.., a federal rule that prohibits a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.42
Thus, public officials hoping to prevail in a defamation suit must prove not onlythat
So. 2d 759 (Fla. App. 1970) (discussing public concern of granting preferential tax
treatment).
" See Fetzer, supra note 26, at 38 ("If there is one truism in the history of constitutional
defamation privilege, it is that 'whatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field
of free debate."') (citing Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457,458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)), quoted
in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
36 See id,
31 See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 268.
11 Id. at 269.
9 ld. at 270-72.
40 Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
41 See id. at 278-79.
4 Id. at 279-80. The Court's description of the standard as "actual malice" may have
been unfortunate. While malice tends to imply an evil or sadistic quality, the Court required
only the state of mind of recklessness. See id This distinction may have confused many in
its application.
2001]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
a statement was false, but that it was published with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard to its falsity.43
The New York Times progeny further developed the actual malice standard. The
Court held in Rosenblatt v. Baer" that the term "officials" included not only elected
officials, but also public employees whose work would engender public interest
apart from the defamation.45 The Court further elaborated that the defendant must
be subjectively aware of the possible falsity of the publication or its "possible
defamatory interpretation."' As to private plaintiffs, the Court held that states must
require a minimum level of fault for a plaintiff to prevail, but that they were
otherwise free to determine the standard of proof required for a defamation action.47
Three years later in the consolidated cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts48
and Associated Press v. Walker,49 the Court expanded the reach of New York Times
to include public figures. Butts was the athletic director for the University of
Georgia. He was accused, in The Saturday Evening Post, of fixing a football
game.5" The Court held that the constitutional standard had been met; Butts was a
public figure by virtue of his position.5 The Court outlined the public figure
standard based on two distinctions between private individuals and public figures.52
First, public figures are less vulnerable to injury because they occupy positions of
power and can more easily rebut defamatory speech. 3 Second, public figures are
less deserving of recovery because they voluntarily expose themselves to the risks
of defamation.5' The extension of the standard to public figures also reflected the
Court's understanding that private sources of power implicated the need for less
43 See id.
383 U.S. 75 (1966).
43 Id.
46 PROSSER, supra note 26, § 112 Supp., at 109; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of the U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
41 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). Some states have taken
significant steps to provide more protection to publishers. For example, New York applies
a "gross irresponsibility" test to protect statements involving matters of "public concern."
Gaeta v. N.Y. News, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that false information
about the wife of a public mental patient was a matter of public concern); see also Dairy
Stores, Inc., v. Sentinel Publ'g Co., 516 A.2d 220 (N.J. 1986) (extending a privilege to all
matters of public concern and protecting false statements that are not made with actual
malice); Sisler v. Gannett Co., 516 A.2d 1083 (N.J. 1986) (requiring that private plaintiffs
meet the actual malice standard if the plaintiff voluntarily engages in conduct that a
reasonable person would know would involve the public interest).
4' 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
49 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
SO See id. at 135-36.
SI See id. at 161-62.
52 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45.
53 See id.
54 See id.
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restricted speech beyond just public officials."
In later cases, the Court outlined a definition of public figure. In Rosenblum v.
Metromedia, Inc., 6 an adult magazine distributor sued a radio station for broadcasts
concerning his criminal charges." The Court extended the public figure privilege
"to all discussion and communication involving matters of public or general
concern," regardless of the fame or position of the plaintiff.." The Court backed
away from this public interest emphasis, however, and began to focus specifically
on the status of the plaintiff.
In Gertz v.. Robert Welch, Inc., 9 an attorney sued the publisher of the John
Birch Society magazine, The American Opinion, for statements accusing him of
being communist.' ° The defendants argued that Gertz was a public figure plaintiff
because he had recently been involved in a politically charged criminal and civil
trial, a matter clearly within the public interest.' The Court, however, chose to
distance itself from the Rosenblum public interest test. In doing so, the Court held
that Rosenblum could not be read to overrule the legitimate state interest in the
"compensation of individuals" for injurious defamation that impinges on "the
essential dignity and worth of every, human being."2 Gertz set forth two major
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren voiced this concern directly:
Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private
sectors are blurred .... [T]here has been a rapid fusion of economic and
political power, a merging of science, industry, and government, and a high
degree of interaction between the intellectual, governmental and business worlds
... .While these trends and events have occasioned a consolidation of
governmental power, power has also become much more organized in what we
have commonly considered to be the private sector. In many situations, policy
determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal political
institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex array of
boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only
loosely connected with the Government ....
[That public figures are not politically accountable] only underscores the
legitimate and substantial nature of the interest, since it means that public
opinion may be the only instrument by which society can attempt to influence
their conduct.
Curtis, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
56 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
57 See id.
"' Id. at 44.
'9 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
60 See id. at 325-26.
6' See id
62 Id. at 341 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 92 (1966)). The common law view of reputation is still evident in the language
employed in Gertz. Underlying the Court's opinion is the notion of a reputational interest
based on preventing the personal and emotional harm resulting from a loss of esteem in
2001] 499
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factors to be used in defining public figures. First, public figures must enjoy greater
access to channels of communication, making them less vulnerable to injury.63
Second, public figures must voluntarily assume the risk of greater public scrutiny-
including risks from defamation-and, therefore, are less deserving of recovery."
Importantly, the Court added, the subject matter for which the plaintiff has availed
himself of public attention must be the same subject matter of the defamatory
statements. 65 Under these factors, the Court concluded that Gertz was not a public
figure." While Gertz had voluntarily assumed the risk for public scrutiny of his
trial work, he had not opened himself to scrutiny for his political affiliations.67
C. The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff
The theory of corporate defamation is problematic. First, it is difficult to
determine if the proper parties have been defamed in order to show that the
corporation has been defamed. Second, it is difficult to define corporate reputation.
Third, it is difficult to determine when a corporation properly fits the definition of
a public figure.
The initial problem in a corporate defamation theory lies in determining who
must be defamed in order for the corporation to be defamed. 6' Generally, there is
one's community.
63 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
" See id. at 345. The Court noted that it is "exceedingly rare" to be a public figure
without voluntary assent. Id. One scholar suggests that this volitional requirement is the
more compelling criterion of the public figure test. See Fetzer, supra note 26, at 45, 48-49
& n.79. In other words, the Court's primary emphasis is on the plaintiff's voluntary injection
into the subject of the publication rather than the importance of the subject itself. See id.
Compare Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (concluding that the plaintiff
undergoing a personal divorce proceeding was not a public figure), and Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, Inc., 439 U.S. 1066 (1979) (concluding that the plaintiff involved in a grand
jury proceeding was not a public figure), with Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d
264 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that a corporate meat distributor was a public figure), and
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1981)
(concluding that a stereo speaker manufacturer was a public figure). Gertz also considered
that plaintiffs may have limited public figure status if they thrust themselves into "public
controversies." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Subsequent cases struggled with defining this status.
See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980) ("A public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the
public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some
segment of it in an appreciable way.").
6s See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
6 See id. at 354.
67 See id.
68 This question can arise for individual plaintiffs as well. For individual plaintiffs, if the
publication does not, on its face, refer to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has the burden of proving,
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no cause of action for a publication that defames a large group or a class of
persons.69 This is based on the rationale that such a general statement could not
injure the reputations of each individual that comprises the group 70 However, if the
statement refers to a definite number of people and the statement could reasonably
apply to an individual within that group, the plaintiff may state a cause of action."'
A corporation is composed of many people, many of whom could be affected by
speech damaging to the entity.72 However, statements directed at its officers,
stockholders, or employees do not defame a corporation." Corporate defamation
consists of statements that directly relate only to the trade or business.74 The
Restatement suggests:
One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes of a
corporation for profit matter which tends to prejudice it in the conduct
of its trade or business or to deter third persons from dealing with it,
is liable to the corporation . . . . One who falsely, and without a
privilege to do so, publishes of a corporation not for profit which
depends upon the financial support of the public, matter which tends
to prejudice it in public estimation and thereby to interfere with the
conduct of its activities is liable to the corporation .... "
In a typical example of corporate defamation, a defendant places a sign on a public
highway that falsely states that the plaintiff corporation released poisons, which
endanger humans and kill livestock.76
Second, it is difficult to define corporate defamation since corporations do not
by way of "colloquim," that the defamatory statement refers to him. See PROSSER, supra
note 26, § 113, at 773.
69 See Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co,, 489 F. Supp. 481,483-84 (1980).
71 See id.
7' See Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1962) (upholding verdict for
the plaintiff where he was a member of a sixty-to-seventy player football team accused of
using drugs). Group defamation of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities has led to the
enactment of criminal statutes in a number of states. See James A. Scott, Note, Criminal
Sanctions for Group Libel: Feasibility and Cohstitutionality, I DUKE B.J. 218 (195 1).
72 See Fred T. Magaziner, Note, Corporate Defamation and Product Disparagement:
Narrowing the Analogy to Personal Defamation, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 963, 966 (1975).
71 See PROSSER, supra note 26, § 111, at 779-80; see, e.g., Life Printing & Publ'g Co.
v. Field, 64 N.E. 2d. 383 (Il1. App. Ct. 1946); People's U.S. Bank v. Goodwin, 149 S.W.
1148 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912); Hapgoods v. Crawford, 110 N.Y.S. 122 (1908).
74 See Brayton v. Cleveland Special Police Co., 57 N.E. 1085 (Ohio 1900).
71 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §561 (1938).
76 See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 224 F. Supp. 978 (D. Or. 1963), appeal dismissed,
336 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1964).
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have a reputation in any personal sense."' A corporation is an "artificial being...
existing only in contemplation of law." '  One federal court underscored "the
obvious fact that a libel action brought on behalf of a corporation does not involve
'the essential dignity and worth of every human being' . . . and, thus, is not 'at the
root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'" 79
Nevertheless, corporations enjoy, certain rights as "persons" under several
provisions of the Constitution." Furthermore, the corporation does have "prestige
and standing in the business in which it engaged...."" Moreover, a corporation's
financial viability may be affected by its reputation for honesty, 2 credit, 3 or other
business characteristics. 4 Nevertheless, "[n]o guiding principles have emerged that
may be uniformly applied to a corporation seekingjudicial vindication for injury to
its reputation."85
Third, the Supreme Court has yet to establish the status of corporate defamation
plaintiffs." Since corporations "are not so much real entities as they are simply
" See PROSSER, supra note 26, § 106, at 745 ("[A corporation) cannot be defamed by
words, such as those imputing unchastity, which would affect the purely personal repute of
an individual,"); see, e.g., Saucer v. Giroux, 202 P. 887 (Cal. App. 2d 1921); Renfro Drug
Co. v. Lawson, 160 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942).
7' Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
71 Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening StarNewspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947,955 (D.D.C.
1976) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)).
80 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771 (1978) (declaring that
corporations have a First Amendment right to free speech). Other rights of corporations
"include the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth
Amendment right to due process, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection
of the laws." Bunker, supra note 18, at 604-05 n. 18; see also HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUsINESs ENTERPRISES § 80, 111-12 (2d ed.
1970). "A Corporation, however, does not enjoy the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and generally has no right of privacy." Bunker, supra; see also HENN,,supra.
81 PROSSER, supra note 26, § I 1l, at 745.
82 Id.; see, e.g., Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local Union No. 2928, 152 F.2d 493
(7th Cir. 1945); Den Norske Ameriekalinje Actiesselskabet v. Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n,
122 N.E. 463 (N.Y. 1919).
83 PROSSER, supra note 26, § 106, at 762; see, e.g., Brayton v. Crowell-Collier Publ'g
Co., 205 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1953); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident
Ass'n, 82 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1936); Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.
1930); Wayne Works v. Hicks Body Co., 115 Ind. App. 10 (1944).
84 PROSSER, supra note 26, § 111, at 749; see, e.g., DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO,
30 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1963); Axton Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Evening Post Co., 183 S.W. 269
(Ky. 1916); St. James Military Acad. v. Gaiser, 28 S.W. 85 (Mo. 1894); R.H. Bouligny, Inc.
v. United Steelworkers of Am., 154 S.E.2d 344 (NC. 1967).
8" Fetzer, supra note 26, at 36. Courts have taken inconsistent positions when comparing
natural persons with corporate defendants. See infra notes 87-139 and accompanying text.
86 The Court has heard, however, a defamation case involving a corporate plaintiff. See
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Nevertheless, the
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means of structuring financial transactions," corporationsare neither clearly private
individuals nor public figures.8 7 In search of definition, the lower courts have taken
a wide variety of approaches. While scholars have attempted to classify the
approaches into several categories,88 a survey of cases reveals a widely unsettled
body of law.
Though most courts coalesced to the Supreme Court's retreat from Rosenblum,
one court chose to adopt a public interest test to determine corporate plaintiff status.
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 9 a federal district court
declared that media critics should be afforded greater protection from corporate
plaintiffs than from individual plaintiffs. 9 Martin Marietta involved a corporate
defense contractor that sued the publisher of The Washington Star.9 The Star
alleged improper entertainment of Defense Department personnel at a stag party.92
The court held that corporate defamation suits must meet the actual malice standard
whenever the subject of defamation involves the public interest.93 In so ruling, the
court recognized important distinctions between corporate and individual plaintiffs,
including a corporation's lack of a private life.94 Because the article involved
entertainment of public officials for the purpose of influencing expenditure of
public funds, the court ruled that the alleged entertainment was a "legitimate public
controversy."9' The court held that Martin Marietta was a public figure for the
limited issues discussed in the article." Perhaps in response to the problems
inherent in defining "public interest," only one other court has followed this
reasoning. In US. Energy Services v. Colen,97 a Florida state court held that an air
Court did not decide the public figure status of the corporation. The Court held that a
construction company could receive damages based on the dissemination of an erroneous
credit report. The plurality decision stated that confidential credit reports were not a matter
of public concern-and thus the defendant was ineligible for the actual malice privilege of
Sullivan and Gertz. See id. at 763. Additionally, the Court has suggested that the status of
the defendant as a media entity might influence the standard a plaintiff must meet. See, e.g.,
id; Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
s Bunker, supra note 18, at 598.
88 See id. at 599; Fetzer, supra note 26, at 35-86; Douglas E. Lee, Public Interest, Public
Figures, and the Corporate Defamation Plaintiff: Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune,
81 Nw. U. L. REV. 318-48 (1987).
89 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976).
90 See id. at 955-56.
9' See id. at 949-50.
9 See id.
93 See id. at 956-57.
' See id. at 956. Drawing on the rationale of Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the court
emphasized that "[n]o event in the life of a corporation involves such sacred personal events
as marriage and divorce." Id.
91 ld. at 957.
6 See id.
9' 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1481 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990).
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conditioning business was required to meet the actual malice standard because it
was associated with a matter of public concern.9
While Martin Marietta received immediate attention for its "boldness," many
courts openly rebuffed its rationale."° Nevertheless, subsequent cases began to
further scrutinize corporate defamation plaintiffs. In Steaks Unlimited, Inc., v.
Deaner,0 ' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals appeared to take the Martin Marietta
approach seriously, citing the case without adverse comment."'° Steaks involved a
corporate meat distributor that conducted a four-day beef sale at area department
stores that included a large advertising budget." 3 A local television station aired
reports charging the distributor with misrepresentation."0 ' Like Martin Marietta,
the Steaks court emphasized that broad policy concerns are involved with corporate
defamation plaintiffs:
In recent years, there has been an increase in consumer interest and
awareness. Consumer reporting enables citizens to make better informed
purchasing decisions .... Application of the public figure rule to sellers
such as Steaks, which through advertising solicit the public's attention
and seek to influence consumer choice, therefore serves the values
underlying the First Amendment by insulating consumer reporters and
advocates from liability unless they have abused their positions by
knowingly or recklessly publishing false information.'
Because of its own behavior, therefore, the corporation had "injected itself into a
matter of public interest."' ' Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff was a
public figure for purposes of the "controversy" that resulted from its large-scale
advertising campaign."7
9' See id
9 See Fetzer, supra note 26, at 74.
'o See, e.g., Trans World Accounts, Inc., v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D.
Cal. 1977); Vegod Corp. v. ABC, 603 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886
(1980).
101 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980).
102 See id. at 274 n.47.
03 See id at 266-68.
104 See id.
105 Id. at 280.
106 ld. at 274.
107 See id. The lower court, as well, emphasized that Steaks Unlimited had
voluntarily involved itself in a large-scale steak sale, which was a matter of
public interest, by its widespread advertising and its management of the sale.
By inviting the public's attention to the sale, plaintiff thrust itself into the vortex
of any public comment regarding its management of an unusual, large-scale sale
involving the public's health.
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Following Steaks, the majority of decisions have interpreted Gertz strictly. '0
These courts have held that there must be a nexus between the subject of self-
promotion and the subject of the defamation suit. Therefore, advertising itself does
not automatically make a corporation a public figure.'" In Blue Ridge Bank v.
Veribanc, Inc.,"' the Fourth Circuit held that a bank was not a public figure because
its promotional activities were not linked to a specific subject of defamation, though
the bank had engaged in extensive advertising."' Correspondingly, the court in
National Life Insurance Company v. Phillips Publishing, Inc."' held that a
corporation was a public figure because the subject of its advertising (good financial
health) was the same as the subject of the defamation suit (allegations that the
corporation was a poor investment)."' In contrast, some courts have applied Gertz
more flexibly, determining that voluntary publicity may result in public figure
status."" For example, in Sunshine Sportswear & Electronics, Inc. v. WSOC
Television, Inc., ' the court found an electronics store to be a public figure because
of its extensive advertising."6
Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 468 F. Supp. 779, 784 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
"' See Bunker, supra note 18, at 600 ("Of twenty reported cases identified in the period
under study [1988-1993] ... thirteen cases adopted a stricter approach to the Gertz criteria
. . . ."); see, e.g., Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., 988 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1993);
Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d 612 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 856 (1988); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1988);
Long v. Cooper, 848 F.2d 1202 (1 Ith Cir. 1988); Kroll Assocs. v. City and County of
Honolulu, 833 F. Supp. 802 (D. Haw. 1993); Saro Corp. v. Waterman Broad. Corp., 595 So.
2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), rev. denied, 604 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1992); Southern Air
Transport, Inc. v. Post-Newsweek, 568 So. 2d 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Osborne v.
Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 18 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); New
Franklin Enters. v. Sabo, 480 N.W.2d 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Mich. Microtech v.
Federated Publ'ns, 466 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 438 Mich. 872
(1991); Foothill Fin. v. Bonneville Int'l Corp., 19 Media L. Rep. 1575 (Utah Dist. Ct. 1991).
Several scholars have alluded to the general notion of strict and elastic applications of Gertz.
See, e.g., BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY: THE PREVENTION AND DEFENSE OF
LmGATION, § 7.6, 354 (Supp. 1993); Bunker, supra note 18, at 600.
" See Bunker, supra note 18, at 601.
"0 866 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1989).
" See id at 683.
Our resolution of this issue does not turn on the extent of defendant's
advertising effort and accepts as a fact that Blue Ridge Bank enjoys a relatively
high public profile in Floyd County. It is the absence of a correlation between
plaintiff's promotional efforts and defendant's publication that is determinative.
Id at 688 n.10.
*12 793 F. Supp. 627 (D. Md. 1992).
113 See id
"1 See Bunker, supra note 18, at 600.
"s 738 F. Supp. 1499 (D.S.C. 1989).
11 See id. "Through their extensive advertising, the plaintiffs engaged the public's
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Other courts have determined that a corporation is a not a public figure where
commercial speech is involved.'17 These courts have held that if the defamatory
statements stem from commercial speech, then the corporation is not subject to the
actual malice standard. For example, the Third Circuit in US. Healthcare v. Blue
Cross of Greater Philadelphia"' held that a health insurance company defamed by
a competitor's advertisement was not subject to the public figure standard." 9
Other courts have taken unique approaches to defining the corporate public
figure. One court refused to make a distinction between natural persons and
corporate plaintiffs altogether. In Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated
Press,2 ° the federal district court refused to distinguish between corporations and
individuals for determining public figure status.' In Trans World, the corporate
plaintiff claimed defamation by a published series of Federal Trade Commission
reports that alleged wrongful debt collection practices.' 2 The court concluded that
the plaintiff was a public figure for the limited scope of the issues in the reports.'
Unlike Martin Marietta, the court did not analyze whether the issues in the report
were of public interest.'24 More importantly, the court held that this analysis
applied to corporate plaintiffs in the same way it would be applied to human
plaintiffs, noting that "the distinction between corporations and individuals is one
without a difference."'125
In contrast, one scholar has advocated a "particularized approach" that takes
into account the attributes of the corporate plaintiff on a case-by-case basis in order
to determine public figure status. 126 An approval of this approach was suggested in
attention and therefore, assumed the accompanying risk. Just as the plaintiffs had the means
to conduct their advertising campaigns, they could have used the same means to refute any
criticism they received from the defendants." Id. at 1507.
117 See Bunker, supra note 18, at 602.
1IS 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1990).
" See id. at 933. The court suggested three factors with which to distinguish commercial
speech from noncommercial speech. First, "is the speech an advertisement;" second, "does
the speech refer to a specific product or service;" third, "does the speaker have an economic
motivation for the speech." Id. Speech that is deemed commercial is granted less protection
under the First Amendment. See id. at 932.
120 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
121 See id. at 819.
122 See id at 817.
123 See id at821.
124 See id. at 819.
125 Id.
126 See Fetzer, supra note 26, at 83-84 ("[T]he corporate factor should be a significant and
active criterion .... The question whether a corporation is a public figure should be
determined on a case-by-case basis within the current framework of constitutional
privilege.").
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Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.' 27 In Bruno, a large corporate boat
manufacturer sued the publisher of the Boston Globe.' Several Globe articles
alleged that the corporation had manufactured defective boats."29 The First Circuit
ruled that corporations could not be considered public figures as a class. 3 ° The
court noted that some corporations did not enjoy special advantaged access to the
media, and that the selling of a product could not amount to a public controversy. 3'
On the other hand, the court noted that some corporations do fit this description.'32
Accordingly, the court reasoned that while commercial conduct could give rise to
public figure status in some cases, in this case, the plaintiff was only a "successful
manufacturer-merchant" and did not achieve the level of a public figure.'
While praising the "particularized approach" of Bruno, the court in Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of US., Inc., 3 "went on to model its analysis and result more
nearly after the Steaks approach to product marketing."'' In Bose, a corporate
stereo equipment manufacturer brought a product disparagement suit against the
publisher of Consumer Reports. 6 The court reasoned that a consumer's interest
in obtaining product information significantly outweighed a manufacturer's interest
'21 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980).
128 See id at 584.
129 See id. at 585.
13o See id at 589. The district court, however, supported a per se rule conferring public
figure status on corporations. The court argued that corporations were more like Gertz public
figures than private individuals. Furthermore, corporations had more access to means of
communications and had voluntarily subjected themselves to public scrutiny by placing
products in the market. The court, therefore, ruled that corporations should be treated as
public figures whenever the subject of defamation involved product quality. See id. at 585;
Fetzer, supra note 26, at 78 (describing the First Circuit opinion in Bruno).
'31 See Bruno, 633 F.2d at 591.
132 See id.
" Id at 592. Nevertheless, the court remanded the case in order to establish a fuller
record of the plaintiff's activities. The court instructed the lower courtto determine "whether
the prominence, power, or involvement of the company in respect to the controversy-or its
public efforts to influence the results of such controversy-were such as to merit public
figure treatment." Id.
131 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 466
U.S. 485 (1984).
' Fetzer, supra note 26, at 79.
136 See Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1250-51. The court held that the New York Times standard
applied to product disparagement suits as well as defamation suits. See id. at 1271. Product
disparagement differs only slightly from defamation: both result from the publication of
false statements. However, defamation requires injury of an entity's reputation that lowers
its esteem, while product disparagement requires injury to a product's reputation that lowers
its commercial value. See generally Magaziner, supra note 72, at 963 (discussing the
similarity between corporate defamation and product disparagement). The plaintiff also sued
for unfair competition and violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1976). See Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1250.
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in its commercial reputation. "7 Moreover, stated the court, a corporation's interest
in reputation is not as important as an individual's interest in reputation.'38
Applying the "particularized test" of Bruno, the court held that Bose was a "limited-
purpose public figure."'3 9 The court explained that the extensive advertising of
Bose boasted of the speaker's uniqueness. 4 The quality of the speaker's sound,
therefore, was a matter of public controversy. Bose voluntarily assumed the risk of
.defamatory speech by choosing to market its product heavily.' Therefore, for
purposes of the quality of the speaker's sound, Bose was a public figure.'4
Since New York Times v. Sullivan, courts have examined a wide variety of
factors in deciding whether corporations are public figures. Courts have looked at
a corporation's consent to public attention, its access to channels of commu-
nications, its use of advertisement, and the connection between commercial speech
and the subject of the defamatory speech. Not surprisingly, these courts have come
to a wide variety of conclusions. Courts have found some corporations to be public
figures, some not to be public figures, and yet others to be limited-purpose public
figures. However, the court in Martin Marietta suggested, in dicta, another
possibility: aper se publicfigure status for corporate plaintiffs."' In other words,
corporations; like public officials, should be subject to the actual malice standard
as a matter of law. While mostly ignored by scholars and courts, this approach
would best protect the constitutional values invoked by New York Times v. Sullivan.
III. CORPORATIONS SHOULD BE TREATED AS PER SE PUBLIC FIGURES
A. First Amendment Interests Are Best Served With General Rules
Courts have applied a wide variety of factors in determining the status of the
corporate defamation plaintiff. Focusing on the similarities of corporations to
individual public figures, these tests vary equally in their results. In response,
commentators have proposed a series of particularized tests, attempting to take into
account the qualities of individual corporate litigants. A general rule, however,
more appropriately governs the interests at stake in corporate defamation cases.
Particularized tests require courts to engage in extensive fact-finding. For
, See Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1271.
13 See id. at 1270.
'39 Fetzer, supra note 26, at 79.
40 See id. Bose spent over $600,000 on promotional advertising between 1969 and 1979
to promote the new speakers. See Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1273 n.38.
'" See Bose, 508 F. Supp. at 1249.
142 See id.
14 See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 956
(D.D.C. 1976) ("It would be possible to hold ... that the malice standard applies to any libel
action brought by a corporate plaintiff.") (emphasis added).
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example, the Fetzer particularized test "involves a detailed, fact-sensitive analysis
... . [that] calls on the courts to carefully scrutinize corporate plaintiffs-their
characteristics, operations and influence-and determine how such factual elements
affect the First Amendment and reputational interests at stake."'" The public figure
presumption proposed by Professor Bunker"" would also require a detailed analysis
of each corporate litigant-litigating the issue of whether the corporation should be
considered a public figure.
These approaches create several problems. First, particularized tests create
unpredictable rules. Requiring the weighing of many factors and values means that
courts will decide these issues in many different ways. Unpredictability means that
litigants will not be able to act in reliance on well-supported expectations. This
leads, inevitably, to a greater amount of litigation and to less uniform standards
across jurisdictions." Consequently, citizen activists will not be able to rely
effectively on precedent since each corporate plaintiff faces potentially different
burdens of proof.
Adding to this unpredictability is the difficulty and complexity of the issues
involved. Seeking to define slippery concepts, public figure analysis has yielded
widely varying results. For example, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 7 the Court split
considerably over whether the wife of a famous businessperson was a public
figure. 8 In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders," the Court split on the
question of whether credit reporting is a matter of public concern. '50 In comparison,
public official defamation cases, utilizing a per se approach to plaintiff status, have
yielded a more consistent and predictable body of law.'
Second, a particularized approach allows more defamation cases to proceed past
the pleading stage. The primary goal of corporations in SLAPP litigation is to
exhaust citizens by bringing them to court.' Corporations can more easily fulfill
this goal if courts are required to first examine the public figure status of each
'" Fetzer, supra note 26, at 86.
'4 See Bunker, supra note 18.
t46 Courts also have a general interest in efficiency. See FED. R. EviD. 102 ("These rules
shall be construed to secure ... elimination of unjustifiable expenses and delay."). For
example, courts seek rules that eliminate unnecessary collateral issues. See, e.g., Mo.-Kan.-
Tex. R.R. v. McFerrin 291 S.W.2d 931, 940 (Tex. 1956) (reasoning that the inconvenience
to the court of exploring a collateral matter outweighs its probative value).
i 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
148 See id.
149 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
1SO See id.
..' See generally CLIFTON 0. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS: THE
EVOLVING LAW OF LIBEL (1971) (discussing the historical evolution of civil libel suits
instituted by public officials).
'52 See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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corporation that files a defamation suit.' 3 Alternatively, a per se public figure rule
means that less corporate plaintiffs can validly sue for defamation since only the
most serious corporate criticism may proceed to trial. Under a general rule, citizen
activists can speak confidently knowing that their criticism cannot be challenged
unless it is made with "knowledge that it [is] false or with reckless disregard of
whether it [is] false or not."'4
Finally, particularized tests run counter to the principles of First Amendment
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has stated its desire for a "broad rule of general
applicability" even if it "necessarily requires treating alike cases that involve
differences as well as similarities.""' While particularized rules may be appealing
in the precision with which they fit individual cases, First Amendment rules also
function to demonstrate fundamental constitutional principles. As one
constitutional scholar describes this conflict, "[tihe principal defect of all law is at
the same time its most essential and most valuable characteristic-its generality."'156
While conceding this disadvantage, a general rule governing corporate defamation
best serves the First Amendment interests at stake. Courts can more easily create
rules that describe constitutional principles. Citizen activists can act under an
appropriate level of free speech protection, understanding the predictable limits
within which they must act. Moreover, corporate plaintiffs are properly disallowed
from using the defamation tort to harass and threaten those who disagree with their
policies.
' if a case is not dismissed on summary judgment, a defendant's costs increase
enormously. See David A. Hollander, The Economics ofLibel Litigation, in THE COSTS OF
LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 278 n.27 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam
eds., 1988). While a defendant can respond to a complaint for under $5,000, a relatively
uncomplicated case may cost over $250,000 to defend through trial. See id.
'i N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
... Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 499-500 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
156 CHARLES HOWARD MCILwAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, ANCIENT AND MODERN 33
(1940). The inherent generality of constitutional governance is perhaps its most familiar and
long-standing quality of criticism. See id. The earliest ofpolitical thinkers were familiar with
this problem:
The law cannot comprehend exactly what is noblest or more just, or at once
ordain what is best, for all. The differences of men and actions, and the endless
irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple
rule. No art can lay down any rule which will last forever .... A perfectly
simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of
simple.
Id. (quoting PLATO'S POLITICuS).
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B. Corporations Have Diminished First Amendment Interests
1. Minimal Reputational Harm
Corporate plaintiffs should be treated as per se public figures because they
suffer minimal harm to their reputations. Defamation law is based primarily on the
interest of protecting reputations. Corporations, by their nature, do not have as high
an interest in their reputation as do private individuals.
Defamation law is designed to protect reputation "in the popular sense," that
which diminishes "the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff
is held."'3 7 The traditional definition of reputation, however, concerns the personal
and emotional consequences of false speech.' In Gertz, the Court stated explicitly
that defamation law exists to protect "the essential dignity and worth of every
human being. '
Corporations are incapable of suffering the reputational injury that defamation
law seeks to redress. The corporation is a "artificial being ... existing only in
contemplation of law.""Iw A corporation does not have social relationships and
cannot suffer the same emotions that a natural person may suffer.' 6' They do not
have a private life. 62 Nor do they have a purely personal reputation.' 63 Moreover,
'" PROSSER, supra note 26, § 11l, at 739.
's See id. Damage to the reputation is defined as that which excites "adverse, derogatory
or unpleasant feelings or opinions against [the plaintiff]. It necessarily... involves the idea
of disgrace." Id.
'9 Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (emphasis added).
'60 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 536 (1819) (opinion
of Marshall, J.). "Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which
the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence." Id.
While partnerships are generally viewed as extensions of individual ownership,
corporations may be regarded as distinct entities from their owners. See HENN, supra note
80, at § 79, 108. A corporation is "an artificial person composed of natural persons; and,
regardless of choice of legal theory, from the point of view of legal relationships, has group
interests more or less distinguishable from the individual interests of its individual
members." Id. This distinction is apparent in the unique attributes afforded to corporations:
limited liability, perpetual life, separation of management and control, and liquidity of
ownership interests. See id. at §§ 68-77, 79.
161 See Fetzer, supra note 26, at 52. "The business corporation has no personality, no
dignity that can be assailed, no feelings that can be touched. Since it cannot suffer physical
pain, worry or distress, it cannot lie awake nights brooding about a dafamatory article."
ROBERT H. PHELPS & E. DOUGLAS HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES 80
(rev. ed. 1978).
62 See, e.g., Golden Palace, Inc. v. NBC, 386 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 1974);
DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. AFL-CIO, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 570-72 (1963).
163 See, e.g., id.
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the reputation of a corporation is not directly attributable to any natural person. The
separation of management control and shareholder ownership "place[s] the
shareholder at a greater emotional and legal distance from an allegedly defamatory
publication concerning the corporation."'" In essence, corporations do not have a
"character to be affected" by defamation. 165
While they cannot be personally harmed, corporations may have a property
interest in their reputations, an intangible asset akin to good will. 11 At common
law, a corporation can recover for insults to its reputation for "financial soundness,
efficiency, credit, management, or other matters affecting business reputation."'67
Corporations may stand to lose substantial amounts of wealth if their corporate
name is tarnished. 6 The concept of reputation as a property interest, however, is
problematic in the defamation law context. First, the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to recognize a heightened constitutional interest based on that party's
economic position.'69 Second, because defamation law is based on personal
'" Fetzer, supra note 26, at 54. This understanding is reflected in the law's distinction
between defamation of a corporation and defamation of a shareholder or officer. See id.; see
also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
,65 Reporters' Ass'n of Am. v. Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n, 79 N.E. 710, 711 (1906).
16 See I.A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL.POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 285 (1953) (defining
goodwill as a property right).
167 Fetzer, supra note 26, at 53; see also Diplomat Elec., Inc., v. Westinghouse Elec.
Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377, 382-83 (5th Cir. 1967); Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 45
F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1930).
16S The economic effect of public opinion is a major consideration for the corporation:
It is not just management psyches that are affected by negative corporate
images. Firms are also affected in more conventional ways by hostile public
opinion generated by adverse publicity. Theyjustify-the large sums that most
of them spend on public relations principally by the rationale that a favorable
public image is good for sales.
RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION 141 (1980).
,69 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(refusing to consider "wealth" a suspect classification for equal protection analysis).
The Court has considered economic status, however, in its analysis of criminal
procedural rights. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,78 (1985) (deciding that the state
must provide psychiatric evaluations to indigent defendants whose sanity is in question);
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983) (holding that the state may not revoke an
indigent defendant's probation for failing to pay a fine). Differing treatment based on
wealth, however, has been justified under a "noncomparative right" analysis: all defendants
are entitled to a minimal level of procedural protection regardless of their economic status.
See Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387, 470-71
(1985). The Court has not been willing to consider economic status once basic procedural
protections are no longer at issue. See id. at 470-72; see, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600
(1974) (rejecting an indigent defendant's claim of a right to court-appointed counsel for the
purpose of discretionary appeals).
In light of this jurisprudence, it would be inappropriate to consider a defamation
[Vol. 9:2
THE CORPORATE DEFAMATION PLAINTIFF
reputational interests, it allows for a "substantial verdict for the plaintiff without
any proof of actual harm to reputation."'' I A corporate plaintiff thus puts
"defamation law in the business of compensating individuals for harms which, from
the perspective of reputation as property, may well be nonexistent."'' Third, unfair
trade practices, product disparagement suits, and market controls diminish the
chances of corporate loss to reputation. " Finally, corporations have unique access
to the channels of communication in order to launch countervailing speech in
response to defamatory falsehoods."
Because the reputation of a corporation is not the same type of reputation as
that of a natural person, defamation law is not well-served by treating personal and
plaintiff's economic interest in determining the standard of review. First, defamation puts
protection of reputation at issue, not the protection of fundamental procedural rights.
Second, the Court has created heightened protections to remedy unfairness to poor litigants,
not to expand benefits for the wealthy. Finally, a defamation plaintiffs financial
considerations are properly left to the question of damages, not to the scope of underlying
liability.
7 LAURENCE H. EDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 95, at 537 (1978); see, e.g.,
Melton v. Bow, 247 S.E. 2d 100, 101 (Ga. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978) (stating
that the plaintiff "had no burden to prove that his reputation had been damaged .... The law
infers injury to his reputation").
17' Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 677, 697 ("[T]he concept of reputation as property is deeply
inconsistent with important doctrines of common law defamation.").
72 A recent example involves the ever-important debate over which corporation uses the
best pizza ingredients. See Pizza Hut, Inc., v. Papa John's Int'l, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 600
(N.D. Tex. 2000), rev'd and vacated, No. 60-10071, 2000 WL 1346149 (5th Cir. Sept. 19,
2000).
"' "The corporation's natural immunity from certain types of reputational injury has been
enhanced by" a recognition of"a corporate right to 'speak out' on a range of issues." Fetzer,
supra note 26, at 54; see, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530 (1980) (holding that restrictions on corporate speech must result from a compelling state
interest); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking down a Massachusetts
statute that restricted the participation of corporations in elections); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (protecting a
corporation's right to speak through paid advertisement, reasoning that a speech interest
based on a "purely economic" motive is not diminished); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975) (recognizing a corporation's constitutional right to commercial speech).
Gertz also defined the public figure as one who possesses "significantly greater access
to the channels of effective communication." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,344
(1974). Under this analysis, corporations are properly considered public figures.
Corporations enjoy greater access to the media due to their economic power. Their "right to
speak out" provides that a corporation's communications are protected on a broad range of
issues.
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corporate reputations as equivalent. As corporations cannot suffer personal
reputation injury, "corporations as a class are less deserving of reputational
protection than individuals.".
2. Incorporation Is a Voluntary Assumption of Risk
The second prong of the Gertz public figure test asks whether plaintiffs have
voluntarily placed themselves in the public eye, therefore assuming the risk of
defamatory falsehoods.7 5 The Court reasoned that purposeful activity that makes
a plaintiff the object of debate should decrease the ability of the plaintiff to
recover. 6 In order to become a corporation, the association must voluntarily
incorporate through the state. By taking the purposeful action of operating under
a state granted charter, the corporation knowingly assumes the risk of being an
object of public debate. Because all corporations fulfill the second prong of Gertz,
corporations are properly considered per se public figures.
The corporation, as opposed to other forms of organization, holds a status that
is voluntarily assumed. Partnerships and sole proprietorships are formed by the
mere association of-people.'" Corporations, on the other hand, must be formed
according to strict legal requirements set forth by the state of incorporation.7 "
Rather than a matter of purely private contracts, compliance with statutory
requirements is what gives rise to the legal existence of a corporation."'
Incorporation, therefore, is an act that is chosen freely by those who would
prefer to assume the corporate form. Simply put, those groups that would prefer to
operate as private contractors may do so as partners, but those who wish to take
advantage of the additional state benefits of the corporate form may chose
incorporation. As one scholar notes:
'74 Fetzer, supra note 26, at 84.
'" See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
176 See id.
'" Partnerships are created solely by the voluntary actions of the parties rather than by
operation of the law. See, e.g., Bartelt v. Smith, 129 N.W. 782, 783 (Wis. 1911) (holding
that written articles are not necessary to form a partnership). The arrangement can exist
without a formal agreement that describes the relationship. See Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S.
280, 287 (1946). A partnership is "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
owners a business for profit .... " REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 10 1(6) (1997).
173 "One or more persons, or a domestic or foreign corporation, may act as incorporator
or incorporators of a corporation by signing and delivering in duplicate to the Secretary of
State articles of incorporation for such corporation." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 53
(1980); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 103, 241 (1974). Corporations are subject to
"formal statutory requirements concerning filing articles of incorporation, publication of
notice, and filing of annual public reports." Fetzer, supra note 26, at 61.
'" See, e.g., State v. Webb, 12 So. 377, 380 (Ala. 1893); Martin v. Deetz, 36 P. 368, 370
(Cal. 1894).
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Regardless of the size of thecorporate operation, individuals usually
incorporate because of some perceived benefit stemming from the
corporate form. Even the smaller entrepreneur--one who might
otherwise conduct his business as a sole proprietor or
partner-frequently incorporates to obtain the limited liability
afforded corporate stockholders or to take advantage of the income
tax provisions applicable to corporations .... [S]uch "special
privileges and franchises" are- tantamount to an assumption of the
additional risk of government intrusion.'s
Incorporation is more than a voluntary assumption of corporate status, however;
it is also a voluntary assumption of corporate responsibilities. Corporations
voluntarily agree to comply with general corporate laws governing business
structure, management responsibilities, and shareholder rights."' Moreover,
corporations are subject to special regulations of their business through control of
securities transactions, corporate taxation, antitrust and trade regulations, consumer
protection, employment law,' 2 and, more recently, foreign and international law.8
The Supreme Court has stated that a corporation, by its "special nature and
voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in
a purely private context."" U Additionally, the Court has stated that corporations
may owe different obligations to the public "by virtue of their creation by the state
and because of the nature and purpose-of their activities."'S Some scholars have
argued that by seeking legislative authority to perform its business as a corporation,
ISo See Fetzer, supra note 26, at 62-63.
181 See HENN, supra note 80, at § 14.
'8 See generally Edwin M. Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on
Corporate Social Responsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1296
(1979).
• For example, American oil companies have come under attack for violating the
standard of care set forth by the Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change. See Janusz Symonides, The Human Right to a Clean, Balanced, and
Protected Environment, 20 INT'L J. OF LEGAL INFO. 24, 25 (1992).
' G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,353 (1977); see also United States
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950) (upholding disadvantageous penalty and
reporting provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act that applied solely to
corporations).
' United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 697-98 (1944); cf HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 3 (1991) ("Classical political economy
purported to develop rules for evaluating a legal regime's justice or fairness without regard
to how its wealth happened to be distributed. As a political and legal doctrine, classicism
identified the best regime as the one that maximized total wealth.").
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corporations agree to act in the public interest.' 6
Critics of the "state creation" theory argue in favor of a "nexus of contracts"
model of corporations. 8 7 Under this reasoning, corporations exist independent of
states, produced voluntarily by individual consent."'8 Articles of incorporation are
"mere procedural" requirements much like the filing ofmarriage certificates.8 9 The
business arrangement of corporations, so it goes, is no more state created than the
personal relationship of marriage.
These critics, nevertheless, confuse the existence of a physical association with
the existence of a legal entity. While business people may freely combine their
resources as a matter of association, it is not until the state has consented that the
association becomes a corporation-a legal entity. Unlike marriages, corporations
cannot exist independent of the state. Unlike corporations, couples may enjoy at
least some types ofmarriage without state consent and are constitutionally protected
from state-imposed divorce. To the degree that a legal marriage depends on state
consent, a "legally married" status is also a creation of the state. Arguments against
the wisdom of the state created marital status, however valid, nevertheless fail to
negate the existence of the state-created corporate status.
In order to exist as a corporation, an association must incorporate.
Incorporation is the voluntary agreement to follow the additional regulations and
legal requirements under which the association must operate. Further, incorporation
involves an assumption of greater public accountability and responsibility. By
taking this purposeful activity, the corporation voluntarily places itself in the public
eye, and assumes the risk of possible defamatory falsehoods. The corporation,
therefore, is most appropriately a public figure under Gertz. Because all
corporations meet this test, by virtue of their status, the corporation is properly
considered a per se public figure.
3. Corporations Fulfill a Public Role
Underlying New York Times is the rationale that speech directed at public actors
deserves greater protection. This reasoning is rooted in two propositions. First, that
government functions best when it broadly allows for dissenting opinions, knowing
that some communications may be false. Second, those in the public arena,
entrusted with power, require greater accountability. These propositions form the
186 See Nader & Green, The Case for Federal Charters, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 1973, at
173-75.
187 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 12 (1991).
188 See id,
9 See Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: Contractual and Private
Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1337-38 (1979).
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basis for the public official privilege and the Gertz public figure test. A complete
analysis of the corporate defamation plaintiff, therefore, should consider to what
extent corporations are public. The corporation's inherent public character and
power dictate that corporations be subject to a higher level of scrutiny as
defamation plaintiffs.
An examination of the history and purpose of the corporate charter illustrates
its public role. Indeed, the "corporation is more 'public' in terms of its origin and
obligations than any other significant business forms."'" Originally, the
corporation existed as an extension of the government, 9' deriving its authority
directly from the state." Early corporations were given charters for a definite
number of years, and their charters were frequently revoked.' Moreover,
corporations were limited in scope to public purposes. As one scholar describes:
America's earliest business corporations, established at the end of the
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, were founded for
public service objectives, such as improving overland transportation
through the establishment of turnpikes, stagecoach companies, and
bridges; encouraging inland water transportation through the building
of canals; the safeguarding of public safety through the creation of
water companies and insurance corporations; providing a reliable
source of credit and currency by forming urban money banks and
rural land banks; and, finally, establishing, manufacturing
corporations to both stimulate the domestic economy and free it of
dependence on British and other foreign industry. Public service and
profit seeking were compatible in early American corporations.'"
90 Fetzer, supra note 26, at 60.
g ' A corporation is "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence." Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636-38 (1819).
'9 See Richard Grossman, Revoking the Corporation, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LNG., 141,145
(1996) ("It was a quo warranto hearing-where the people demanded to know, literally, by
what authority has this subordinate entity taken... an action? And if this entity was
adjudged to have acted beyond its authority, it was declared ultra vires; it was beyond the
authority.").
'91 See ROBERTBENsON, CHALLENGINGCORPORATE RULE, 41-42 (1999); see also Liggett
Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
"9 Epstein, supra note 182, at 1308-09. Observing this philosophy, Alexis de Tocqueville
noted that "Americans of all ages, all conditions and dispositions constantly form
associations" for the good of society. II ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
114 (Random House ed. 1954).
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During the nineteenth century, states began enacting general charter laws,
precipitating a loosening of government control on corporate power."" These
economic advantages encouraged large aggregations of capital to operate in the
corporate form.'" State and federal governments attempted to restrain corporate
action instead through direct legislation and administrative regulation.197
Nevertheless, the corporation has enjoyed considerable growth in power and
influence.""
' See BENSON, supra note 193, at 42-43. Observing this "race to the bottom," Justice
Brandeis remarked:
The removal of the leading industrial States of the limitations upon the size and
powers of business corporations appears to have been due, not to their
conviction that maintenance of the restrictions was undesirable in itself, but to
the conviction that it was futile to insist upon them; because local restriction
would be circumvented by foreign incorporation. Indeed, local restriction
seemed worse than futile. Lesser states, eager for the revenue derived from the
traffic in charters, had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws.
Companies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in states
where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive. The states joined in
advertising their wares. The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.
Liggett, 288 U.S. at 557 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Some have argued that this movement was a "race to the top," since deregulation led to
higher profits. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251,254-56 (1977). Nevertheless, "profit data do not
show a causal link between the removal of controls and higher profits. More importantly,
the data ignore the increase in usurpation of ungranted powers, corporate lawlessness, anti-
social and undemocratic behavior as states let go of the reins." BENSON, supra note 193, at
43.
196 Corporate law became "the source of nearly all great enterprises." Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 76 (1906); see McKinley v. Wheeler 130 U.S. 630,633 (1889) ("[N]early all great
enterprises, for the prosecution of which large expenditures are required, are conducted by
corporations. They occupy in such cases almost all branches of industry, and prosecute them
by means of united capital of their members with increased success.").
197 See BENSON, supra note 193, at 44. Scholars have disputed whether governments have
been successful in bounding corporate behavior. By "financing two-party-only elections, and
by direct lobbying, the business community has for years generally dominated legislators and
captured administrative agencies." Id. Moreover, ineffective controls may minimally alter
corporate behavior while simultaneously serving corporate political goals. For example,
Richard Olney, President Grover Cleveland's Attorney General, argued to railroad
executives that regulation of their industry would "be of great use" to their companies
because it could "satisfy the popular clamor for government supervision of railroads, at the
same time that the supervision is almost entirely nominal." Id. (quoting KENNETH CULP
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 6 (3d ed. 1972)).
19' In 1987, corporations reporting earnings of $500,000 or more "constitute[d] only
about 5% of the total number of business enterprises, but account[ed] for roughly 87% of
earnings from all business." MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW
22 (1995). Presently, one-half of the 100 largest economies in the world are corporations,
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With the growth of corporations "has come a greater resemblance to public
sectors of power" and an increasing difficulty in distinguishing between public
and private forms of power.2'0  Likened to a "mini-state,"' ° scholars have
commented on the nature of corporate power:
Prominent analysts like A. A. Berle, Walton Hamilton, Robert Dahi,
John Kenneth Galbraith, Earl Latham, Richard Ells, and Arthur S. Miller
have correctly perceived the largest corporations to be more like private
governments. "The corporate organizations of business," wrote
Columbia Professor Wolfgang Friedman, "have long ceased to be private
phenomena. That they have a direct and decisive impact on the social,
economic, and political life of the nation is no longer a matter of
argument. 2 °0
Even the United States Chamber of Commerce has stated that "business can no
longer regard its activities as being in the 'private sector' while government
operates in the 'public sector.""'2 3
The actual malice standard works to provide a check on sources of power. The
and 500 corporations control 70% of global trade. See BENSON, supra note 193, at 46
("[Corporations] have the power to run or ruin foreign economies, topple foreign
governments, uproot cultural traditions overnight, threaten whole races of indigenous
peoples, and destroy the global biosphere upon which the survival of future generations
depends."). See generally DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD
(1995).
' Fetzer, supra note 26, at 63; see supra note 55.
200 See supra note 55; see, e.g., Cox Enter., Inc., v. Carrol/City County Hosp. Auth., 247
Ga. 39 (1981) (holding that a "public body corporate" is a governmental entity). The
business community has sometimes encouraged the association of private sources of power
as performing a public role. In 1953, Charles Wilson, president of General Motors and
President Eisenhower's nominee to be Secretary of Defense famously asserted that "what
was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa ." Martin H. Redish
and Howard M. Wasserman, What's Goodfor General Motors: Corporate Speech and the
Theory ofFree Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235,235 (1998) (quoting Excerpts from
Two Wilson Hearings Before Senate Committee on Defense Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 1953, at AS). "On at least-one level, however, Wilson was recognizing an indisputable
fact of modem political life: whatever the government does will inescapably have an
immeasurable impact on the health and welfare of the private corporate world and vice
versa." Id
2'0 Fetzer, supra note 26, at 63; see, e.g., RALPH H. NADER, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 17 (1976); LEE E. PRESTON & JAMES E. POST, PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AND
PUBLIC POLICY: THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 151 (1975).
202 See NADER & SMITH, supra note 6, at 17.
203 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., THE CORPORATION IN TRANSITION-
REDEFINING ITS SOCIAL CHARTER 1-2 (1973).
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rationale for a heightened standard for public officials is based on the idea that
government power must be carefully scrutinized to prevent corruption and abuse." 4
The reputation of persons associated with public service, thus, is considered
minimal in recognition of the importance of speech on matters of public interest. 5
Correspondingly, "the laws for libeling public officials have been narrowed
consistently as the people's right to know about their government and to discuss
their governors has been broadened." 206
In a free market economy, it is equally important to check the corruption and
abuses of private forms of power. As the Supreme Court has noted:
So long as we preserve a predominately free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.
To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.0 7
Maximizing this flow of information demands greater protection for potentially
defamatory speech involving corporations. This concern is especially important in
the context of SLAPPs, since the object of the suit is to quelch the dissemination of
information important to public decision-making. Speech critical of corporations
gives citizens key information on goods and services and helps define consumer
preferences. Moreover, consumer safety may depend on an informed public.
Finally, controlling corporate action though the product market depends on an
educated populace. Citizens must be free to engage in critical speech if the
"aggressive coverage of corporations is to be encouraged."' '
In response to a heightened standard for corporate litigants, corporate theorists
raise several objections. First, critics contend that not all corporations are large and
powerful.2 The corporation, they argue, exists in differing sizes and for varying
204 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, A.B.A. REs. J.
521-649 (1977).
205 See Fetzer, supra note 26, at 63. Professor Tribe points out that "[o]ne teaching of
New York Times v. Sullivan is that reputational interests are attenuated for persons who
become affiliated with government exactly because government itself, unlike individuals,
has no legitimate reputational interest: government cannot be defamed." LAWRENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIoNAL LAW 643 (1978).
206 LAWHORNE, supra note 15 1, at 265.
207 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,765
(1976); see also Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 787 (1985)
("Speech about commercial matters, even if not directly implicating 'the central meaning of
the First Amendment' . . . is an important part of our public discourse.") (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
208 Bunker, supra note 18, at 602.
209 See DOOLEY, supra note 198, at 22 ("The emphasis on economic power should not
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purposes and may not necessarily exert large social power.2"' Corporations are,
nevertheless, generally the form of association of greatest economic power. More
importantly, the heightened requirement for corporate plaintiffs does not require
that all, or even most, corporations be socially powerful. A per se public figure
status is appropriate because it functions well as a general rule. That a per se
standard may work less well for smaller corporations may be disagreeable in certain
instances, but is neverthelessjustified because of its value in most cases. The Court
undoubtedly understood this in New York Times. The per se standard applied to all
public officials, acknowledging that not all public officials are socially powerful.
The standard applies equally to college football coaches as it might to the President
of the United States. In addition, it is notable that the plaintiff in New York Times
was a small-town sheriff, a public official who may have been less powerful than
most modern corporations. That some corporations are not socially powerful,
therefore, should not preclude a per se rule for corporate plaintiffs.
Second, critics might assert that the corporation should be held to the same level
of accountability as the individual since ultimately it is composed of individuals.
Corporate wealth, they argue, is purely private, simply an extension of individual
property defined by contract. This argument, however, fails to consider that
corporate wealth, at least partially, is the product of government activity.
Businesses are able to amass large amounts of wealth because they utilize the
corporate form, a legal status endowed by the state. Moreover, this improved
capacity creates an economic comparative advantage for corporations since they
compete with individuals who do not benefit from a corporate status. The Supreme
Court has noted the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form .... "" The
corporate legal status is a grant of power, requiring a commensurate level of
accountability.
A per se public figure status for the corporate defamation plaintiff fulfills the
obscure the fact that corporations come in many sizes, whether measured by number of
shareholders and employees, extent of assets or amount of earnings and income."). As of
1987, 50.4% of corporations held less than $100,000 in assets. See id.
210 See Epstein, supra note 182, at 1288-90. Corporations may exist as non-profit
associations, public bodies, professional groupings, neighborhood businesses, or as
multinational companies. See id. Epstein argues:
Although all of these entities are engaged in the production and distribution of
socially useful goods and services, each performs a very different social task,
has different constituencies, affects widely divergent sectors of the public, has
different human and capital resources, and poses substantially different issues
of corporate power and accountability. "Corporateness" per se therefore
indicates very little about an institution's social role and responsibilities.
Id. at 1289.
2' Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) (emphasis added).
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underlying goals of New York Times. A per se rule provides the breathing room
necessary for critical opinions on issues of public power. Such a rule recognizes
that the historic rationale of the corporation is to encourage activity fulfilling a
public purpose. Further, a per se rule acknowledges the heightened economic and
social power of modem corporations. Finally, such a rule understands that
corporations have come to resemble public sources of power and that corporations
should face a commensurate level of accountability.
CONCLUSION
Defamation law balances two important interests, an endeavor made no less
onerous in the context of the corporate defamation plaintiff. First, defamation law
seeks to protect reputation, which for the corporation, is a valuable property
interest. Second, defamation law recognizes the interest of free speech,
acknowledging the heightened concern for communications involving public
officials and public figures.
The corporate plaintiff brings a unique set of concerns to the task of balancing
these interests. First, the corporate interest in reputation is low. Defamation law
seeks to protect personal and emotional damage to reputation, a concern that is
uniquely human. Defamation law is not well-suited to protect the corporate
reputation, as this concern is solely a property interest. Second, through the act of
incorporating, the corporation voluntarily assumes the risk of defamatory
falsehoods. By seeking a privileged legal status through the state, the corporation
takes a position in the public eye, subjecting itself to a greater level of public
scrutiny. Third, the corporation fulfills a public role. The modern corporation is
a large economic, political, and social force. The expansion of corporate authority
has blurred the distinction between public and private sources of power. In order
to provide effective accountability, speech involving the corporation carries a
heightened speech interest. The law must allow breathing space for a free
expression of ideas, an accomplishment requiring that some defamatory falsehoods
be tolerated.
A per se public figure status for the corporate plaintiff properly balances the
interests of reputation and speech. Corporations may protect their reputations in
cases where they can show actual malice (knowledge or reckless disregard of the
falsity of the defamatory statements). At the same time, citizen activists are able to
participate under a lowered threat of SLAPP suits. Creating a higher standard for
corporate plaintiffs, a per se status means that fewer SLAPPs will succeed at trial.
A lowered likelihood of success means that more SLAPPs will be dismissed at the
pleading stage, undermining the threat of protracted legal expenses. Furthermore,
a per se standard allows more opportunity to levy sanctions against corporations for
filing frivolous suits. Most importantly, a per se rule creates a predictable level of
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protection for citizen activists, thus providing the necessary breathing space for
healthy public debate.
Finally, a per se public figure status accords with our essential notions of human
dignity. As a constituted people, we have affirmed the belief that the right to speak
is fundamental. Bound by the covenant that our government "shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech,''22 we must diligently protect this right, even in
the face of competing concerns. An unencumbered liberty to search for truth
animated the first principles of our people; its continued promise breathes life into
our constitutional order.
D. MARK JACKSON
212 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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